Top Myths about the Iraq War
I'm tired of politicians who substitute shallow criticisms in lieu of substantive arguments. As the next election approaches just count the number of times that candidates quote economic data in nominal figures to make comparisons that only matter in real terms. It's a popular trick and it warrants exposure, the most recent set of criticisms circulating about the Iraq war. I'm not suggesting there isn't a world view that reasonably opposes the war, I'm simply stating that most war critics are not making those arguments. Here are the false arguments you will hear them make:
1. "There were no weapons of mass destruction!" This is a favorite among war critics. However, it is entirely irrelevent to the pre-war analysis; it only matters that the threat of WMD was credible. It's easy for a political naysayer to wield this soundbite deceptively at the general public. However, it plays no material role in the decision to act militarily against a genuinely perceived threat. What matters is that, prior to the war, you could count on one hand the number of people who believed Saddam did not possess WMD--even among those who favored alternatives to war.
Consider a simple analogy. If a violent criminal pulls a gun on a cop pursuing him from the scene of a crime, and the cop shoots the man perceiving an imminent threat to his life, would you try the cop for murder because you later discovered that the gun was in fact a toy replica? The cop acted on a genuinely perceived, mortal threat.
The naysayers would love to suggest today that the threat wasn't real. Unfortunately for them, that's not what they said when it mattered. Nearly everyone believed Saddam had WMD, including intelligence agencies around the world. Saddam even behaved as if he had WMD because it was the threat of WMD that endowed him with power.
2. "UN inspectors would have proved Saddam did not possess WMD." This fallacy was articulately acknowledged by a war opponent in the Journal of Foreign Policy months prior to the war. This was a false hope because proving the absence of WMD was an impossible standard. Why? Because to say with certainty that Saddam did not have WMD would require inspectors to search every square inch of Iraq--above ground and below--and to say with certainty when they had finished searching that nothing was moved during the course of the search. No amount of UN inspections could have determined that. The only way to know that there were no WMD in Iraq was to put 150,000 US servicemen on the ground--in control of the military, police, and governing body--to search every building, retrieve and sift through every government document and correspondance, and to capture and interview every former government official that may have had knowledge of such weapons. I find it incredibly ironic that the only means by which war critics now know there are no WMD in Iraq is the selfsame target of their criticisms.
3. "The war in Iraq was all about WMD." I never understand why people choose to see in black and white--to assume that every decision is made for one reason only. For some people it was impossible to believe that the first Gulf War could actually be motivated, at least in part, by a genuine need to oppose aggression on a frightening scale--the invasion of Kuwait. No. "It was all about the oil" they would say.
As if to accentuate their ignorance, critics cry out that "if WMD was such a threat in Iraq, then why don't we go to war with North Korea and Iran!" The simple and obvious answer is that Iraq was never about one issue. It was the accumulation of multiple issues, including our need to stand behind post war resolutions made in 1991; to signal to the chaotic and fascist regimes of the world our unwillingness to tolerate threats against the well-meaning and free societies of the world; our intolerance for genocidal treatment of entire populations; and to encourage the growth of a society that offers political and economic satisfaction in lieu of poverty and despair--which is the real catalyst behind the recruitment of terrorists. There is no other country in the World, Iran and North Korea included, that qualify on so many counts.
It's true that the Bush administration placed the greatest emphasis on one factor in particular--the threat of WMD. I believe they considered this a "trump card," one that nobody could refute. But the administration did repeat its justification on all counts, however disinterested the public was in the other reasons.
4. "Bush lied about pre-war intelligence." This is a favorite of mine, having worked at the National Security Agency for four years. There is an erroneous perception in the public that intelligence is black and white (see point #3). The fact is that intelligence is frequently vague. One political commentator aptly stated on "Hardball" once that, regarding pre-war intelligence, "everyone was cherrypicking from a pool of ambigous intelligence." There was evidence suggesting the existence of WMD in Iraq, and there was intelligence that was not evidence of WMD in Iraq. What there never was prior to the war was any intelligence that could disprove the existence of WMD. In a compartmented, dictatorial regime like Hussein's Iraq, the only source of intelligence that could even have known whether WMD existed was Hussein himself. And who would be foolish enough to take him at his word?
It is abundantly transparent that Bush truly believed he would find WMD in Iraq. Even those who (for political gain) accuse the President of lieing about intelligence stop short of suggesting that he did not believed Saddam possessed WMD. What critics also find convenient to ignore is the post 9/11 climate which exposed a colossal liability in interpreting intelligence on the benign side. Would the President's opponents, and the American people, have been any less critical of the President if a terrorist were to have released a biological agent inside the United States that he had obtained from Saddam Hussein? This was a very real dilemma for the United States at that time, and remains a dilemma today in a world where WMD continue to proliferate in the hands of dangerous and ill-meaning regimes. It is why the President of the United States, whoever he is, will always be criticized for decisions he makes, even when they are the right ones.
1. "There were no weapons of mass destruction!" This is a favorite among war critics. However, it is entirely irrelevent to the pre-war analysis; it only matters that the threat of WMD was credible. It's easy for a political naysayer to wield this soundbite deceptively at the general public. However, it plays no material role in the decision to act militarily against a genuinely perceived threat. What matters is that, prior to the war, you could count on one hand the number of people who believed Saddam did not possess WMD--even among those who favored alternatives to war.
Consider a simple analogy. If a violent criminal pulls a gun on a cop pursuing him from the scene of a crime, and the cop shoots the man perceiving an imminent threat to his life, would you try the cop for murder because you later discovered that the gun was in fact a toy replica? The cop acted on a genuinely perceived, mortal threat.
The naysayers would love to suggest today that the threat wasn't real. Unfortunately for them, that's not what they said when it mattered. Nearly everyone believed Saddam had WMD, including intelligence agencies around the world. Saddam even behaved as if he had WMD because it was the threat of WMD that endowed him with power.
2. "UN inspectors would have proved Saddam did not possess WMD." This fallacy was articulately acknowledged by a war opponent in the Journal of Foreign Policy months prior to the war. This was a false hope because proving the absence of WMD was an impossible standard. Why? Because to say with certainty that Saddam did not have WMD would require inspectors to search every square inch of Iraq--above ground and below--and to say with certainty when they had finished searching that nothing was moved during the course of the search. No amount of UN inspections could have determined that. The only way to know that there were no WMD in Iraq was to put 150,000 US servicemen on the ground--in control of the military, police, and governing body--to search every building, retrieve and sift through every government document and correspondance, and to capture and interview every former government official that may have had knowledge of such weapons. I find it incredibly ironic that the only means by which war critics now know there are no WMD in Iraq is the selfsame target of their criticisms.
3. "The war in Iraq was all about WMD." I never understand why people choose to see in black and white--to assume that every decision is made for one reason only. For some people it was impossible to believe that the first Gulf War could actually be motivated, at least in part, by a genuine need to oppose aggression on a frightening scale--the invasion of Kuwait. No. "It was all about the oil" they would say.
As if to accentuate their ignorance, critics cry out that "if WMD was such a threat in Iraq, then why don't we go to war with North Korea and Iran!" The simple and obvious answer is that Iraq was never about one issue. It was the accumulation of multiple issues, including our need to stand behind post war resolutions made in 1991; to signal to the chaotic and fascist regimes of the world our unwillingness to tolerate threats against the well-meaning and free societies of the world; our intolerance for genocidal treatment of entire populations; and to encourage the growth of a society that offers political and economic satisfaction in lieu of poverty and despair--which is the real catalyst behind the recruitment of terrorists. There is no other country in the World, Iran and North Korea included, that qualify on so many counts.
It's true that the Bush administration placed the greatest emphasis on one factor in particular--the threat of WMD. I believe they considered this a "trump card," one that nobody could refute. But the administration did repeat its justification on all counts, however disinterested the public was in the other reasons.
4. "Bush lied about pre-war intelligence." This is a favorite of mine, having worked at the National Security Agency for four years. There is an erroneous perception in the public that intelligence is black and white (see point #3). The fact is that intelligence is frequently vague. One political commentator aptly stated on "Hardball" once that, regarding pre-war intelligence, "everyone was cherrypicking from a pool of ambigous intelligence." There was evidence suggesting the existence of WMD in Iraq, and there was intelligence that was not evidence of WMD in Iraq. What there never was prior to the war was any intelligence that could disprove the existence of WMD. In a compartmented, dictatorial regime like Hussein's Iraq, the only source of intelligence that could even have known whether WMD existed was Hussein himself. And who would be foolish enough to take him at his word?
It is abundantly transparent that Bush truly believed he would find WMD in Iraq. Even those who (for political gain) accuse the President of lieing about intelligence stop short of suggesting that he did not believed Saddam possessed WMD. What critics also find convenient to ignore is the post 9/11 climate which exposed a colossal liability in interpreting intelligence on the benign side. Would the President's opponents, and the American people, have been any less critical of the President if a terrorist were to have released a biological agent inside the United States that he had obtained from Saddam Hussein? This was a very real dilemma for the United States at that time, and remains a dilemma today in a world where WMD continue to proliferate in the hands of dangerous and ill-meaning regimes. It is why the President of the United States, whoever he is, will always be criticized for decisions he makes, even when they are the right ones.
